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In Pursuit of Justice: Debating the Statute of Limitations for Nazi War 
Crimes in Britain and West Germany during the 1960s. 
 
 
 
Up until 1979, the ability of West German courts to prosecute Nazi war criminals 
was hampered by a Statute of Limitations for acts of manslaughter and murder.  
Throughout the 1960s, the issue generated considerable public discussion, both 
within the Federal Republic and among the international community.  As 
prosecutors, politicians, journalists and Holocaust survivors (among many others) 
debated the need for continued war crimes trials, it was clear that there remained 
significant limits to western understandings of the Nazi genocide.  This article 
analyses public responses to the Statute in both West Germany and Great Britain 
and argues that the whole affair has had a crucial impact on the development of 
international justice and todayǯs pursuit of war criminals. 
 
 
 
In spring 2013, it was announced that 50 former Auschwitz guards would stand trial in 
Germany for their role in the Holocaust.1  In July that same year, the Simon Wiesenthal 
Institute launched a poster campaign with the slogan, 'late, but not too late', appealing 
for the public's help in identifying and tracing any remaining Nazi war criminals.2  In 
each case the message was the same: that the passage of time has not diminished the 
guilt of these perpetrators, and that old age should not be a barrier to their prosecution.  
However, the very fact that such trials can still take place at all is highly significant.  
Indeed, up until 1979, the ability of (West) German courts to prosecute former Nazi 
perpetrators remained in considerable doubt, hindered by a Statute of Limitations that 
imposed a strict time limit for investigating cases of murder and manslaughter. 
 
This Statute has received relatively little scholarly attention.  Works that have been produced 
focus predominantly on pertinent legal issues such as post facto legislation, rather than 
exploring the Statute’s broader historical significance.3  Notable exceptions to this trend 
include recent studies by Frank Buscher and Marc von Miquel, although here the emphasis 
has, quite legitimately, rested upon the political discussions at the heart of the controversy.4  
This approach, combined with intricate contemporary accounts published by the likes of Rolf 
Vogel and Karl Jaspers, means that the parliamentary debates on this issue have now been 
well-documented; their reception elsewhere in society, considerably less so.5   
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This, however, has not prevented scholars from making great claims about the Statute’s 
impact on West Germany’s relationship with the Nazi past.  Peter Reichel argues that the 
debates opened up a delayed inter-generational dialogue on this period, while Jeffrey Herf 
suggests the Statute constituted a wake-up call for the Federal Republic, bringing the ‘crimes 
of the Nazi past, as well as the magnitude of judicial failure of the 1950s, to centre stage in 
West German politics’.6  Peter Steinbach sees the eventual changes that were made to the 
laws governing murder as proof of the Republic’s ‘commitment to develop a moral-political 
consciousness of history, as well as a sense of ethical-political responsibility.’7  
Consequently, as Buscher points out, the Statute, and especially the round of debates heard in 
1965, has been depicted as one of the Bundestag’s ‘finest hours’, evidence of liberal 
democracy in action.8  The reality, however, was rather more complicated and closer analysis 
of the Statute’s resonance within wider society highlights the persistence of earlier post-war 
mythologies, evasions and distortions in respect of the recent past.   
 
This article consequently examines the considerable public discussion generated by the 
Statute during the 1960s.  Drawing upon a variety of sources including government 
memoranda, opinion poll data and media reports, it explores the arguments put for and 
against continued war crimes investigations, and asks just where the impetus for continued 
judicial action was coming from.  Above all, this article demonstrates that this was an issue 
that resonated far beyond the Federal Republic of Germany.  Responses in Britain offer a 
particularly striking case study in this regard.  As one of the ‘four Great Nations’ that had sat 
in judgement at Nuremberg, and conducted additional war crimes trials within its own zone 
of occupied Germany, Britain had been at the heart of early policy initiatives against Nazi 
perpetrators.9  As this article will show, there were numerous groups within Britain who 
deliberately looked to this legacy as proof of the nation’s moral duty to pressure the West 
German government into abolishing the Statute and ensure that the Federal Republic 
remained on the ‘right’ path.  Given an existing historiography that tends to be quite critical 
of Britain’s record on Nazi war criminals, this episode offers an important reminder that war 
crimes trials remained a sensitive yet persistent talking point on both sides of the North Sea – 
and debates over the Statute may be seen as a crucial step on the path towards the formation 
of a wider, western Holocaust consciousness.10   
 
A ‘Guilty Few’ 
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Arguably, the sheer scale of the Nazi genocide, and the number of perpetrators required to 
orchestrate it, had been underestimated (or conveniently ignored) from the start.  The 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg focussed on the most high-profile, surviving 
members of the Nazi leadership such as Hermann Göring, Rudolf Hess and Julius Streicher, 
while Britain's prosecution of Bergen-Belsen personnel in the previous months saw the key 
defendants demonised in the popular press as 'beasts' and 'monsters'.11  Together, these 
proceedings facilitated the popular belief that the blame for atrocities rested firmly on those at 
the top, or a sadistic few.   
 
By March 1948, British military courts had tried 909 individuals, compared with the 
prosecution of 1,672 defendants in the US occupation zone, and 427 in the French zone.  Of 
these, 214 people were sentenced to death, 258 were acquitted, and the remainder received 
various periods of imprisonment.12  The British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin noted 
optimistically, ‘the whole process of trying war criminals is now nearly finished… [and] will 
be completed in a few months’.13  The implication (and one that was shared by the West 
German population) was that all the ‘really guilty’ individuals had been dealt with; there was 
simply no need for further proceedings.   
 
The western Allies’ commitment to war crimes proceedings certainly transpired to be 
relatively short-lived, affected in part by the onset of the Cold War.  There was no second, 
Four-Power tribunal and it is notable that many of cases heard in the British zone focussed on 
crimes perpetrated against Allied personnel, including the infamous murder of British POWs 
who escaped from Stalag Luft III.14  These were war crimes that would have a particular 
resonance for British audiences back home, where public opinion was already struggling to 
understand why precious resources should be squandered on the former enemy.  A lack of 
manpower and financial support also meant that British enthusiasm for trials soon waned.15 
 
Likewise, the number of war crimes cases being heard before reconstituted West German 
courts declined sharply during the 1950s, falling from 68 in 1950 to just 17 by 1957.16  The 
vast majority of these trials also ended with the acquittal of all defendants.17  The political 
climate increasingly favoured a reduction of existing sentences and a general amnesty for 
former Nazis rather than continued punitive action.  Popular references to ‘the war-
condemned’ or ‘so-called war criminals’ added to the sense that the number of genuine war 
criminals was very small, and precluded any wider soul-searching regarding the recent past.18   
4 
 
 
The legal framework of the new West German state did little to challenge this mode of 
thinking.  The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, ratified in May 1949, 
enshrined a Statute of Limitations of fifteen years for cases of manslaughter and twenty years 
for acts of murder.19  Working from the war’s end in 1945, Nazi crimes falling into these 
categories would have to be investigated before 1960 and 1965 respectively.  The inclusion 
of a Statute of Limitations harked back to the Criminal Code of 1871; its re-adoption after the 
Second World War offered a reminder of the values intrinsic to the formation of the modern 
German nation, and a return to those laws and civil rights trampled so brutally underfoot by 
the Nazi regime.  National Socialism was thus presented as an aberration in an otherwise 
healthy German history. The return to the nineteenth century model also meant there was no 
specific framework for dealing with the peculiar nature of Nazi atrocities; perpetrators of the 
Holocaust would effectively be treated like any other ‘common’ criminal. 
 
Conventionally, the 1958 Ulm trial of ten former Einsatzkommando members is regarded as a 
key turning point in West Germany’s engagement with the Nazi past, ushering in a brand new 
series of war crimes investigations – coordinated by a brand new Central Investigating 
Agency in Ludwigsburg.20  The Ulm case itself came about through the chance discovery of 
former SS-Oberführer Bernhard Fischer-Schweder, head of an Einsatzkommando unit 
responsible for the mass murder of Jews and Communists along the Lithuanian border in 
1941.  Subsequent investigations led to the unearthing of nine more members of his unit, all 
of whom had been living quietly in West Germany, holding respectable jobs as lawyers, 
salesmen, policemen or, in one case, an optician.21  Their arrest generated a popular sense of 
shock, anger and dismay.  References to ‘the murderers among us’ were taken up by the West 
German press, with one publication stating firmly, ‘one can only draw a line under the past if 
one can say, with confidence, that all or at least the predominant part of the concentration 
camp criminals are punished’.22  Opinion polls conducted by the Allensbach Institut für 
Demoskopie (IfD) in the aftermath of the Ulm case also identified an upsurge in popular 
interest in the matter and a 54 per cent approval rating for renewed war crimes proceedings.23 
 
Yet older perceptions of Nazi perpetrators did not necessarily give way.  Critics likened the 
new wave of investigations to a second, unnecessary denazification process and, as initial 
moves were made to challenge the Statute of Limitations in the 1960s, talk of a ‘guilty few’ 
retained its currency.24  The Minister of Justice, Fritz Schaeffer, and the West German 
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Ambassador to the United States, Karl Heinrich Knappstein, both insisted that only a very 
small number of people would actually benefit from the Statute coming into effect.25  In 
1965, as the deadline for war crimes investigations loomed ever closer, Schaeffer’s successor, 
Ewald Bucher, similarly refuted the need to make any adjustments to West Germany’s legal 
framework, arguing, ‘we must be prepared if necessary to live with a few murderers’.26 
 
Petitioning for Change 
 
During the 1960s, the West German government faced three choices regarding the 
prosecution of Nazi perpetrators.  It could uphold the Basic Law and allow the Statute to 
come into effect, thereby bringing an end to war crimes investigations; or it could vote to 
extend it, granting prosecutors additional time to gather evidence and initiate proceedings 
against remaining suspects.  Alternatively, the Statute could be abolished altogether, enabling 
war crimes trials to continue unimpeded for as long as necessary.  It would become an issue 
of intense parliamentary debate in West Germany and, it is the contention of this article, one 
that illustrated the limits of Holocaust awareness in other nations too during this period. 
 
The first motion against the Statute was presented to the Bundestag by the SPD politician 
Walter Menzel in March 1960, coinciding with the widely-publicised arrest of Adolf 
Eichmann by Mossad agents in Argentina.27  Although there were no legislative decisions at 
this stage, and the deadline for ‘lesser’ crimes including acts of manslaughter was allowed to 
pass, the question of Nazi perpetrators did start to resonate beyond parliamentary and judicial 
circles.  Key names capturing the public’s imagination at this time included Josef Mengele, 
whose post-war fate remained the subject of great speculation; Hans Eisele, the former 
Buchenwald doctor who fled to Egypt in 1958 to evade war crimes investigators and Karl 
Silberbauer, the Gestapo officer responsible for arresting Anne Frank, captured in 1963.  The 
former Sobibor and Treblinka commandant Franz Stangl was also hunted during this period, 
eventually found in 1967,  hiding in Brazil. 
 
Consequently, the early 1960s saw increased public dialogue on the war crimes issue and the 
prescribed cut-off point for dealing with Nazi acts of murder, 8 May 1965, became much 
more contentious.  In 1963 and 1964, for example, members of the German Protestant 
Church gathered in Düsseldorf for two successive synods that included a discussion on the 
relevance of the Statute for Nazi atrocities.  Despite expressing reservations over the courts’ 
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ability to uncover the facts so long after the events concerned, the Church took up the cry for 
continued investigations.  A seven page document disseminated through the pulpit, as well as 
the religious and secular press, stressed how all Germans were implicated in Nazi crimes, 
rued the Church’s failure to take concerted action at the time, and insisted that ‘in any 
society, evil must be recognised as abominable and must be punished accordingly’.28  The 
wider West German media was also generally supportive of further trials, regardless of their 
political leanings.  Der Spiegel, for example, framed a fourteen page article on the Statute 
with an arresting front cover photograph depicting three elderly figures about to be shot by 
Nazi commandos, reminding people of the brutal nature of the crimes under discussion.29  
  
Members of the Bundestag were allowed a free vote on the Statute in the spring of 1965.  
Opinion was split between and within political parties.  Broadly speaking, though, the 
conservative CDU tended to argue that prosecutors had now had sufficient time to bring 
suspects to account and the Statute should therefore be allowed to come into effect.  The FDP 
also wanted to uphold the Statute, maintaining that any other move would undermine public 
faith in the rule of law. The SPD, though, generally agreed with survivors' groups that the 
magnitude of Nazi crimes must override other concerns, that the original criminal code had 
been drawn up to deal with crimes committed in ‘everyday’ circumstances rather than a racial 
war of extermination, and that investigations into those responsible should thus continue.30  
Observers within the British Foreign Office summed up the prevailing mood: 
 
The question has placed the Federal Government in a dilemma.  On the one hand, 
they do not wish to be exposed to the charge that they are using the Statute of 
Limitations in order to cover up Nazi crimes...  On the other hand, they do not want 
these trials, with all the received publicity about German wartime atrocities that 
accompanies them, to drag on indefinitely year after year and so to keep alive in the 
world the feeling that the Germans are a particularly cruel and evil race who should 
not be trusted.31 
 
Reporting for the Jewish Chronicle, Eleonore Sterling suggested that there was a ‘striking 
discrepancy’ between public and private opinion on the war crimes issue.32  Buscher too has 
argued that ‘the awareness shown by some politicians, journalists, legal experts and 
intellectuals failed to have a trickle-down effect’ and that ‘the average citizen refused to 
break with the Vergangenheitspolitik of the 1950s’.33  Opinion polls seem to confirm that the 
effects of the Ulm and Eichmann trials quickly wore off to be replaced by a sense of ‘trial 
fatigue’.  In October 1963, the IfD found that just 34 per cent of people questioned approved 
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of continued trials.34  In May 1965, as parliamentary debates over the Statute reached fever 
pitch, pollsters again took to the streets to gauge public feeling on the matter.  344 people 
over the age of 21 were interviewed across the Federal Republic, with the results showing 32 
per cent in favour of further trials, and 57 per cent preferring to draw a final line 
(Schluβstrich) under the whole Nazi era. 35  The sample for this survey was, admittedly, 
extremely small, yet the findings were borne out by other opinion researchers.  The Wickert 
Institute, for example, found 37 per cent of men and just 22 per cent of women supporting 
continued war crimes proceedings.36 
 
Significantly, there tended to be a rather different set of results if people were interviewed in 
relation to a specific case.  During the Auschwitz trial, for example, DIVO found 53 per cent 
of respondents articulating the need for such proceedings to be continued – and staff noted 
that even this figure was in marked decline to the responses generated by the Eichmann trial 
three years earlier.37  Arguably, it was easier for people to agree with the punishment of a 
particularly notorious individual or set of crimes, cases that were already attracting 
considerable media attention, than the somewhat abstract principle of continued war crimes 
investigations.  Again, there was perhaps a sense that these were isolated affairs, with the 
defendants continuing to fit the mould of a radical ‘few’.  By contrast, altering the Statute 
would imply that there was a wider set of responsibilities to contend with, and this was a far 
more unsettling prospect.   
 
The apparent reluctance to challenge the Statute of Limitations stemmed from a variety of 
concerns.  There were legitimate questions over the reliability of witness and defendant 
memories so long after the commission of the crimes and the likelihood of securing a 
successful prosecution.38  It could also be argued that continued trials served no social 
purpose; the perpetrators of Nazi crimes had (as illustrated so keenly with the Ulm case) long 
since been reintegrated into the fabric of West German society.39  Furthermore, there were 
genuine concerns about the legality of making any alterations to the Statute.  War crimes 
trials were already clouded by debates over retrospective legislation, and wider events in 
1960s West Germany suggested that the nation’s fledgling democracy was coming under 
increased attack.  1962 saw the Spiegel Affair and the State’s encroachment on press 
freedom, while 1966-68 witnessed the controversial Grand Coalition, Extra-Parliamentary 
protests and Kurt Georg Kiesinger’s Emergency Laws.  Thus, while foreign pressure groups 
argued that extending or abolishing the Statute of Limitations would prove West Germany’s 
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democratic credentials, West Germans themselves feared it would have exactly the opposite 
effect.  Indeed, regarded in this light, it would appear that people were keen to learn from the 
past and avoid any further situations where laws and civil liberties could be swept aside. 
 
However, debates over the Statute also enabled the persistence of older mythologies, 
including efforts to relativise Nazi atrocities.  Amid the IfD's 1965 survey, for example, two 
thirds of those opposed to further trials based their conviction on the simple refrain that other 
war crimes had been convicted and gone unpunished.  References to the bombing of Dresden 
or the atomic explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki harked back to claims of victors’ 
justice that had been circulating since 1945.  Likewise, 57 per cent of participants in the 
survey argued that Germans should stop ‘dirtying their own nest’ (Nestbeschmutzen), a 
popular sentiment of the post-war era that criticised those who would persist in muckraking 
and bringing up the past.40 
 
Even when people did voice support for changing the Statute, their reasoning remained quite 
introspective.  Over a third of those questioned by the IfD pointed to the potential damage to 
the Federal Republic’s world status, or the shame ‘we as Germans’ would face if 
prosecutions ended, and 14 per cent argued that world opinion demanded action.  Such 
concerns for West Germany’s image abroad had been seen before.  In the run up to the 
Eichmann trial, the then chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, expounded on this very issue and 
several West German newspapers reported on the effects that much-publicised case had upon 
American views of the German people.41  Similar thinking was articulated in a March 1964 
conversation between a British embassy official and Dr Erwin Schule, director of the 
Ludwigsburg Zentrale Stelle: 
 
If it were really true that the majority of West Germans did not wish investigations of 
this nature to continue, there would, he [Schule] said, be no investigations because the 
popular will would be expressed in amnesty legislation...  What he did often find 
when addressing public audiences was feelings of uneasiness and shame which 
translated themselves into the suggestion that such proceedings should be hushed up 
so as not to drag the name of Germany in the mud.42 
 
Such comments suggest an intriguing potential relationship between West German policy and 
external, foreign opinion.  There was an ongoing tension between being seen to do the right 
thing, and the fear of injuring the nation’s reputation by allowing it to be continually 
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associated with the crimes of the previous regime - but would this be enough to abolish the 
Statute?   
 
British Responses to the Statute 
 
As the politicians and general population of the Federal Republic wrestled with the question 
of continued war crimes investigations, other nations also took up the issue.  The 1960s are 
frequently pinpointed as an era of sudden, critical engagement with the National Socialist 
legacy and a time when the very concept of ‘The Holocaust’ gained currency in the western 
world.  Public demonstrations over the Statute of Limitations, as seen, for example, on the 
streets of Paris and Los Angeles, can thus be linked to the lingering effects of the 1961 
Eichmann trial, a new growth in survivor testimony and the emergence of a younger 
generation prepared to ask difficult questions about the recent past.43  Public rallies were 
accompanied by a host of letters, petitions and resolutions sent either directly to Bonn or to 
West German embassies throughout the world, trying to persuade the Federal German 
government to overturn the Statute.  British Labour politicians had already telegraphed their 
support for Menzel’s 1960 presentation to the Bundestag and in December 1964, David 
Ennals, MP for Dover and himself a former prisoner of war, led another petition calling on 
West Germany to maintain its investigations into Nazi war criminals.  53 of Ennals’s fellow 
MPs signed the petition, including Philip Noel Baker who had famously urged the House of 
Commons into action after Kristallnacht in 1938.44  The same month saw Robert Kempner, 
former Assistant Chief Counsel for the US Prosecution at Nuremberg, taking to North 
German radio, addressing his concerns about the Statute direct to the West German people.45  
Elsewhere, the renowned Nazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthal orchestrated a letter-writing 
campaign, sending over three hundred missives to ‘influential’ people around the globe and 
urging them, in turn, to lobby the Federal German government.46 
 
As the involvement of Kempner, Wiesenthal and Noel Baker illustrates, many of the voices 
heard during this affair came from individuals with a prior history of trying to draw attention 
to Nazi crimes.  Survivors’ groups, Jewish organisations and trade unions were particularly 
vocal, understandably wanting to see justice delivered on behalf of their murdered brethren 
and political comrades.  There was also an immense amount of pressure from the Soviet 
Union and its satellite states, although this was unsurprising given the existing ideological 
tensions and a history of East German critiques on its western counterpart’s handling of the 
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past.47  The USSR heard public speeches from its own Nuremberg prosecutors, alongside 
statements from former soldiers and concentration camp survivors and the screening of a 
documentary film on Auschwitz.48  China, meanwhile, attacked the Statute as ‘monstrous’, a 
‘brazen defiance of international law’ and ‘sacrilege to millions upon millions of innocent 
victims’.49  Most of these actions were condemned by western observers as Communist 
‘propaganda’, but the potential ramifications of the Statute could not be so easily dismissed. 
 
Advocates of continued war crimes investigations stressed a sense of duty towards the 
victims of the Third Reich, and the distinctiveness of Nazi atrocities.  The Archbishop of 
Boston, for instance, proclaimed that ‘there should be no moratorium on an evil as great as 
genocide...  The most monstrous event in our contemporary history must be answered in 
justice as long as our generation is alive.’50  There was also an oft-repeated argument that 
continuing war crimes trials were imperative for demonstrating the Federal Republic’s 
commitment to democratic values and the sincerity of its attempts to atone for the recent past.  
A letter writer to the New York Times argued ‘West Germany can only become a deep-rooted 
democracy provided that she purifies herself from the poison in her bloodstream’.51  Such 
arguments were routinely couched in the rhetoric of a German ‘rebirth’ or ‘re-civilisation’, 
and were not confined to external critics.  During the March 1965 Bundestag debates, the 
CDU politician and legal scholar Ernst Benda launched an impassioned plea for amending 
the Statute, asserting: ‘one unpunished murderer among us is one too many, and if we 
abandon the hunt for them, we might as well abandon the republic and revert to living in 
caves.’52  
 
In a similar vein, the early 1960s saw various organisations, including the Institute of Jewish 
Affairs, the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Wiesenthal Centre, writing to 
governments around the world to ascertain whether they too had a Statute of Limitations as 
part of their criminal code.  The results became further grist to the pro-trial campaign: if other 
nations did not feel the need for a time limit on acts of murder, why should the Federal 
Republic?  Again, the matter became framed in terms of West Germany’s own international 
standing; its rehabilitation would not be complete until it came fully into line with the rest of 
the democratic world.53  However, as an examination of British responses to the Statute 
reveals, pressure was not just being directed at West Germany.   
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Mainland Britain did not have the same experiences of occupation or collaboration to contend 
with as its European neighbours after 1945. Instead, the emphasis was on a more celebratory 
narrative – Britain as victor, liberator and upholder of justice.  However, it is precisely due to 
this last role that many felt compelled to look to Britain for guidance on the Statute of 
Limitations.  In 1964-5, the government faced numerous requests by domestic and 
international campaigners to ensure that the Federal German government came ‘to a correct 
appreciation of the situation’.54  Much of the external lobbying stemmed from Eastern bloc 
countries, but there were appeals from victim groups as well who argued that ‘pressure... by a 
friendly power such as the United Kingdom might be more effective’ in influencing West 
German policymakers than communist agitation.55  There was also a repeated emphasis on 
the nation’s legal obligations to intervene.  A note submitted to the British Embassy in 
Prague, for example, urged the British government to act on the basis that it was a signatory 
to the 1945 London Agreement.56  This provoked the retort that Britain had already 
discharged its duties under that charter, having played a full role in the United War Crimes 
Commission, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the military courts within 
their former occupation zone.  The investigation into Nazi perpetrators, officials argued, was 
now an entirely German matter.57  Nonetheless, criticisms of Britain’s stance continued, with 
the domestic press suggesting that the current fiasco was a direct result of the Allies’ own 
failings in the immediate aftermath of the war.  The Guardian commented:  
 
The Western Powers should not forget that in their day, they were none too quick off 
the mark in the same field.  Undoubtedly, they allowed far too many former Nazis to 
creep back into positions of influence...  The sovereign West German government 
could hardly be expected to weed out men whom the Allies had permitted to 
survive.58 
 
Within Britain, calls to intercede on the Statute were increasingly mounted by representatives 
of the Anglo-Jewish community, politicians and various workers friendly societies.  The 
National Union of Furniture Trade Operatives – which had a 1,400 strong membership - was 
among those urging the Prime Minister to ‘join with other nations’ and demand that the 
Federal Republic extend the Statute.59  In the House of Commons, the Labour MP for 
Wolverhampton North East, Renée Short, inquired on two separate occasions as to whether 
the issue would be discussed during Wilson’s forthcoming visit to Bonn.60  By January 1965, 
observers within the Foreign Office conceded ‘public interest in this country is growing’ and 
‘we shall have to work out our attitude to this question’.61    
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All of this supports the view, put forward by David Cesarani among others, that the 1960s 
were far from constituting an era of British ‘silence’ on the Holocaust.62  It is clear, though, 
that the impetus for most of this discussion was coming from the bottom up; the government 
itself was understandably reluctant to be seen as meddling in another nation’s domestic 
affairs.  When Barnett Janner suggested that an intercession by the Prime Minister might 
strengthen Chancellor Erhard’s hand in the forthcoming Bundestag debates, Wilson rejoined 
that such measures would be ‘unhelpful and ill-advised’.63  When Wilson and Erhard finally 
met in February 1965, the Prime Minister was quick to reassure him that he had ‘no desire at 
all to interfere’.64  On the one hand, the British stance was pragmatic, suggesting lessons had 
been learned from the occupation period when West Germans frequently dismissed Allied 
measures as nothing more than ‘victors’ justice’.  On the other hand, though, British reticence 
persisted even when directly approached for help by the Federal German government.   
 
In November 1964, West Germany responded to the growing international pressure by 
issuing an appeal for other nations, particularly the former Allies, to release any relevant 
documents that could aid war crimes investigators.  Internal correspondence between the 
British Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office reveals that the UK held material relating 
to some 280 cases of 'illegal killing' that had not been followed up during the occupation 
period. There was some debate, though, as to what, if anything, should be done about this.  
‘Either we must tell the Germans that we still have a number of documents which it would 
take two or three months to go through... or we must omit all reference to the existence of 
these documents and give a more general reply on the lines that we have been unable so far to 
find anything which would be of interest to the Germans’, noted officials.65  The time 
required to peruse the material was only part of the issue; there were also concerns about 
political security.  The Ministry of Defence declared that German experts ‘certainly cannot’ 
be granted access to the material themselves, while, for the Foreign Office, W.B.J Ledwidge 
appealed for more leeway, pointing out, ‘the United States Government have already done 
this [opened their archives] and we should not seem to be less forthcoming or there may be 
press and parliamentary concern.’66  This comment again sums up much of the political 
response to the Statute both in Britain and in West Germany: public relations assumed a 
greater importance than any moral obligation to ensure Nazi perpetrators could not evade 
justice.   
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While Britain dragged its heels, suggesting that material may already be in Bonn or with the 
UNWCC, or offering to consult its records in respect of any ‘specific case which the Federal 
Government is able to name’, the USSR launched a scathing attack on the whole documents 
issue.  For the Soviets, the West German request for assistance was a ploy, ‘an improper 
attempt to disguise the actual amnesty of the fascist murderers and to whitewash its unlawful 
actions in the eyes of world public opinion’.67  In reality, the information request constituted 
a crucial effort to ‘stop the clock’ running down on Nazi perpetrators as, under  West German 
law, the Statute of Limitations would be interrupted at the beginning of a criminal 
investigation. In theory, the move could have enabled West Germany to enjoy the best of 
both worlds, using the existing system to prosecute more war criminals while sparing the 
nation any challenge to its legal framework. The information request also underscores the 
constraints that West German prosecutors were working under at the time.  The realities of 
division, not to mention the chaos at the end of the war, meant evidence was not in any 
single, easy to access archive.   
 
When analysing the various petitions against the Statute during this period, it is important to 
recognise that there was no simple dichotomy between governments and various pressure 
groups.  Even among those lobbying for continued trials, there was indecision as to the best 
means of achieving this. The Board of Deputies of British Jews, for example, saw debate 
between a leadership that preferred to adopt a resolution and make gentle overtures to the 
West German Ambassador, and a membership keen to generate greater publicity for the 
campaign through public meetings, vigils and a march on the West German embassy.  In 
January 1965, the Workers’ Circle Friendly Society opined that the issue ‘merits much more 
action and publicity’, while the Leeds Jewish Representative Council questioned whether 
local action could advance the campaign.68  The Deputy for Hightown Central Synagogue in 
Manchester ultimately decided to organise his own silent march of protest.69  In trying to 
quell some of these elements, the Board was anxious to avoid any possible disruption to the 
diplomatic process, or doing anything that might create the impression that they themselves 
‘had not been active in the matter’.70   
 
Making A Decision 
 
It was, of course, relatively easy for foreign observers to weigh in and critique the Federal 
Republic’s handling of the past, yet ultimately the decision about the Statute of Limitations 
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was one for the West Germans alone.  In March 1965, after prolonged parliamentary 
discussions, the Bundestag agreed on a compromise, voting 344 to 96 to extend the Statute of 
Limitations to 31 December 1969.  This meant the clock would effectively be reset to start its 
twenty year countdown from the moment of the Federal Republic’s formation in 1949, rather 
than the war’s end in 1945, thereby giving prosecutors an additional four years to conduct 
their investigations.  The justification for this move was that the courts had been in no 
position to operate properly amid the upheaval of the immediate post-war era.  Legal critics 
could be appeased by the fact that there was already a precedent for amending the Statute's 
start date; the original deadline, set from end of the Third Reich, had itself deviated from 
standard procedure which would have started the Statute from the time of the actual 
commission of the crimes.  However, the result was not universally popular and the Minister 
for Justice, Ewald Bucher, resigned in protest, adding to the cracks then emerging between 
the CDU-FDP coalition. 
 
Over 120 cases were heard before West German courts between May 1965 and May 1969, 
encompassing a range of Nazi atrocities from the mass shootings committed by police 
battalions and Einsatzgruppen along the Eastern Front, to crimes perpetrated within specific 
camps such as Flossenburg, Mauthausen and Auschwitz.71  Consequently, the extent of the 
Holocaust was being documented in increasing detail.  It was not long, though, before the 
Statute of Limitations re-entered public discourse.  This next series of debates over its utility 
echoed much of what had gone before in 1964-5, although Die Zeit also engaged with the 
new international climate of détente, stressing how the Soviet Union was only now opening 
its archives and allowing West German prosecutors access to new evidence.  More time, it 
was argued, was essential to sift through this material; the Statute of Limitations would have 
to be re-examined.72 
 
This time, though, it was not simply a question of whether to continue trials but also just 
what, exactly, constituted an act of murder.  Under Clause 50 of the West German Penal 
Code, the maximum penalty facing those convicted of being an accessory to murder was 
likely to be the same as that for the main offender.  In September 1968, however, amid large 
scale investigations into the administrative personnel of the RSHA, this article was amended.  
If the court was not satisfied the defendant had acted out of ‘base motives’, the highest 
penalty he or she could now receive would be equal to the fifteen year prison sentence 
afforded to manslaughter cases.  The Statute of Limitations for that category of crimes had 
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already come into effect in May 1960.  Consequently, many ‘desk murderers’, together with 
those who simply claimed to have been following orders, could evade punishment; the vital 
role of middle class professionals in the development and implementation of the ‘Final 
Solution’ continued to be obscured.73 
 
The distinction between callous killers acting out of ‘blood lust’ and those merely doing their 
‘duty’, had already become a marked feature of war crimes proceedings.  During the 1963-5 
Frankfurt Auschwitz trial, for example, the emphasis in both the press and the courtroom was 
placed firmly on what Rebecca Wittmann has termed the ‘excess perpetrators’, individuals 
who went beyond the bounds of their ‘job description’ to commit acts of gross violence.  
Defendants who showed a rare moment of mercy towards their victims received favourable 
treatment before the courts compared with colleagues who had seemingly taken great 
pleasure in devising their own unique brand of torture.74  Likewise, numerous trials still saw 
defendants depicted as ‘devils’ within media reports – a dehumanising rhetoric that enabled 
the 'ordinary' population to distance themselves from these characters and avoid any deeper, 
critical reflection on how the Holocaust had been made possible. 
 
On 26 June 1969, the Bundestag again voted to extend the Statute, this time for an additional 
ten years.  279 members supported the bill, 126 opposed it and there were 4 abstentions.  A 
decade later, the vote was much closer, yet finally, on 3 July 1979, the application to remove 
the Statute for all cases of murder was passed after a ten hour parliamentary debate, 255 votes 
to 222.75  The path was now free for West German prosecutors to continue their work in 
relation to the crimes of National Socialism.  Why the change of heart?  Clearly, the 
increased opposition vote between 1969 and 1979 demonstrates that the problem of Nazi war 
criminals remained highly contentious; public opinion too was shown as increasingly 
opposed to further legal proceedings.76  To some extent, the answer may rest with broader 
cultural developments taking place at this time, particularly the screening of the American 
television miniseries, Holocaust in the spring of 1979 which is frequently credited with 
effecting a shift in popular attitudes to the Nazi past. 77  Certainly, correspondence generated 
by British government officials, delegates within the Council of Europe and members of the 
public during this last round of debates routinely referenced the Statute within the context of 
Holocaust.78  While the victims of the Nazi genocide had remained anonymous, distant 
entities during earlier discussions, the fictional Weiss family depicted in Holocaust 
encouraged public empathy and, in this climate, the idea that those responsible for atrocities 
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should be brought before a court of law regained some momentum.  Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt underscored Holocaust's impact when he told the Bundestag: 
 
 This film forces one to think critically, to think morally... thinking is needed also in 
 view of the decision each of us will have to make for himself late this year regarding 
 the Statute of Limitations for the prosecution of murder.79   
 
Analysing responses to the Statute between 1978-9 also reveals some striking developments 
from the 1965 debates.  It is notable, for instance, that a significant number of petitions 
addressed to the British and West German governments now came from younger people.  The 
British government, for instance, received petitions from student unions and lecturers at the 
Universities of Birmingham, Salford, Warwick and Queen's, Belfast.80  A shift in rhetoric 
was also evident, with an increased tendency to stress the universal nature of the war crimes 
issue.  Here, the prosecution of Holocaust perpetrators was juxtaposed with more recent 
atrocities committed in Vietnam and Cambodia, as well as electoral successes enjoyed by Far 
Right groups such as the National Front in Britain; consequently, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe noted that the Statute was not just about held relevance 
'for history, for the present and the future' and 'for all countries'.81  This was an issue that now 
went beyond Germany and the Second World War. 
 
Foreign pressure also appeared to gain significance during this final round of debates.  
Speaking at a synagogue on the anniversary of Kristallnacht in November 1978, Chancellor 
Schmidt pledged that politicians and legislators would 'listen to what our Jewish citizens, our 
friends in Israel and our neighbours have to tell us' and 'obtain advice and participation from 
many sources'.82  This comment was a green light to lobbying parties such as the Board of 
Deputies of British Jews who sent a copy of Schmidt's speech to the Foreign Secretary, David 
Owen, to justify advances to the West German Ambassador.83  Wiesenthal, meanwhile, 
organised a visit of US politicians, civil rights leaders and Jewish representatives to Bonn to 
press the government on the Statute, and the Auswärtiges Amt received further petitions from 
the US House of Representatives, the Polish, Israeli and Luxembourg governments and 'tens 
of thousands of privately written protests'.84  Observers within the British embassy in Bonn 
concluded, 'there can be no doubt that the government are very conscious of these external 
aspects and are taking them fully into account', and Schmidt did reference the 'enormous 
number of petitions' received from within and outside West Germany during a speech 
to the Bundestag in March 1979.85    
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Against this background, the British government adopted a slight change in its own tactics. 
Alongside the standard response that it would be inappropriate for Britain to involve itself in 
an internal, German matter, petitioners were now invited to direct their concerns straight to 
the Federal German government. In February 1979, for example, Lord Goronwy-Roberts 
wrote that 'there has been some recent well published evidence of the degree of concern 
which continues to be felt among people of all ages in the Federal Republic about this kind of 
issue'; sensing that the time was ripe for change, Foreign Office staff began to encourage, 
rather than shut down, protests by academics, MPs, synagogues and the Association of 
Jewish Ex-Servicemen.86 
 
Conclusion 
 
The periodic controversies over the Statute of Limitations for Nazi crimes demonstrate that 
there was no linear pattern of ever-critical engagement with the Nazi past.  A series of 
silences and distortions continued to hold sway within the Federal Republic, while the wider, 
western world also struggled to grasp the enormity of the Holocaust.  Britain, for instance, 
continued to cling to the concept of a 'guilty few', and seemed loathe to dwell the past, with 
government staff seemingly taken aback by the levels of interest displayed by certain MPs, 
Anglo-Jewish groups, trade unionists and others.  Britain's response to the Statute of 
Limitations thus provides a valuable context for exploring later developments in the nation's 
Holocaust consciousness, including the protracted passage of the War Crimes Act in 1991. 
 
At the same time, debates over the Statute are also crucial for understanding contemporary 
responses to genocide, having provided the framework for today's international justice model.  
It was in direct response to the prospect of former Nazis evading justice through a legal 
loophole that the UN introduced the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in 1968, and the European 
Convention on the same issue was opened for signatures in 1974.87  More recently, the notion 
that acts of genocide should be exempt from any legal prescription was further cemented with 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.88  None of these measures has the full 
backing of the international community, and there remains significant debate over the 
necessity of such measures.  War crimes investigations and prosecutions too, remain 
imperfect affairs.  Nonetheless, the very existence of these conventions has symbolic value, 
designed to show would-be transgressors that human rights violations will not go unpunished 
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and act as some form of deterrent.  All of this can be traced directly to the legacy of the 
Holocaust and the gradual realisation that unprecedented atrocities called for new forms of 
legislation.  It is in this context, that the significance of West Germany’s Verjährung debates 
of the 1960s becomes truly recognised. 
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